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Abstract. This paper examines different approaches to rationality
in analytic philosophy and AI, in the light of Bermu´dez’s proposal
that a full account of rationality must aim to explain how agents can
both select and explain actions, as well as assessing them against
some normative standard. We briefly survey instrumental, linguis-
tic and discursive accounts of rationality, and conjecture that Haber-
mas’s notion of the “three roots” of epistemic, teleological and com-
municative rationality comes closest to providing a satisfactory ac-
count, or at least the ingredients of such an account. This is contrasted
with the widely-accepted BDI model of rational agency in AI, which
we argue falls short of a full model of rationality and in particular,
fails to provide a convincing model of linguistic communication.
1 Introduction
A major paradigm in AI research has been the development of so-
called ‘rational’, ‘autonomous’ agents, with a degree of consensus
around the BDI architecture [28, 29, 39] which aims to develop soft-
ware entities that are capable of pro-attitudes such as Beliefs, Desires
and Intentions. As Bermu´dez notes, the concept of rationality finds
applications in various disciplines
from economics to political science, fron philosophy to psy-
chology, and from management science to sociology [2, p. 1]
while it is not clear whether the word is used with the same sense in
all these different contexts. In this paper we will explore how ratio-
nality is understood and applied within Artificial Intelligence, against
the setting of a brief survey of accounts of rationality from analytic
philosophy.
The ability to conduct fluent natural language conversation has
been considered a hallmark of human-level AI (or AGI) since Tur-
ing’s classic paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” [37],
while there is a long-standing view in some schools of philosophy
that thinking, rational agents must be able to express their thoughts
in language and interpret the speech and thoughts of other agents.
One strand of research in computational linguistics (CL) builds on
Searlean Speech Act Theory (SAT), and formalisations of SAT as
a CL programme fed in turn into development of communication
languages for artificial software agents (Agent Communication Lan-
guages or ACLs) [26].
1.1 Outline of the paper
We begin in Section 2 by sketching some different conceptions of
what is meant by rational agents in AI and philosophy, discussing
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instrumental, linguistic and discursive notions of rationality. Section
3 very briefly summarises some essential characteristics of Anglo-
American Speech Act Theory, and Section 4 deals with some clas-
sic formalisations of SAT. Section 5 shows how some of this work
fed into the specification of communication languages for artificial
agents. Throughout the paper we note a tension between agent au-
tonomy and the requirements of successful communication, and con-
clude in section 6 that this tension is never fully resolved.
2 What are Rational Agents?
As noted above, a significant strand of AI research over the last cou-
ple of decades has concerned the development of autonomous agents,
which may consist of software-controlled robots or of “disembod-
ied” software entities [28, 39]. Agents are said to be autonomous
and rational to the extent that they act independently of specific in-
structions from their human operators or “principals” and do not rely
on extensive built-in knowledge, but make their own decisions based
on logical and/or mathematical reasoning using information derived
from their perceptions of the state of the world [29]. The term “ratio-
nal agents” has been used somewhat loosely, and this section looks at
some differing ideas of what it means for a system, agent or person
to be considered rational.
2.1 Desiderata for rational agents
Bermu´dez (op. cit.) questions whether there is a unitary notion of
rationality, and proposes that any satisfactory account must serve
“three different explanatory projects”:
• The project of guiding action: given an agent’s information
about the state of the world, the actions which can be per-
formed and the expected consequences of these actions in
the given conditions, a theory of rationality should idenify
a “privileged subset” of actions which will bring about the
preferred outcome. This is the notion of rationality which,
according to Bermu´dez, most interests decision theorists.
• The project of normatively assessing action: what falls un-
der assessment is not only the agent’s choice of actions, but
the quality of their information-gathering, probability judg-
ments, whether they have succumbed to “framing effects”
and so on. Many philosophers think of rationality in these
terms; some would interpret “normativity” more broadly to
encompass social norms of what is considered to be appro-
priate behavious (e.g. Brandom [3, 4]).
• The project of explaining/predicting action: this involves ei-
ther working back from an agent’s observed actions to a
characterisation of their beliefs, desires and other psycho-
logical states, or working out what an agent is likely to do
given a knowledge of their psychological profile [9]. This is
stated to be the aspect of rationality of most interest to psy-
chologists and economists.
The question poses itself: which conception of rationality is most
relevant to AI? We might well answer: all of them. Bermu´dez in fact
concludes that the three dimensions are interpendent, and a satisfac-
tory theory must address them all. However, he argues persuasively
that decision theory cannot serve the three explanatory projects si-
multaneously, and so cannot form the basis of a unitary theory of
rationality. In what follows we look at various existing accounts of
rationality, and consider whether they can be carved up in a way that
corresponds to these projects.
2.2 Instrumental rationality
A leading AI textbook [29] defines a “rational agent” as an entity
that perceives and acts in an environment, and acts so as to maximise
the expected value of some performance measure. There are various
levels of agency:
1. A reflex agent responds directly to percepts according to a series
of if-then rules which could be encoded as a lookup table, without
planning ahead or modelling any aspect of the environment other
than its immediate percepts.
2. A model-based reflex agent keeps track of the state of the world
via internal representations.
3. A goal-based agent acts in order to achieve certain goals. An ex-
ample would be a self-driving car, which has the goal of transport-
ing people or goods from one location to another: the agent would
need a repertoire of actions and a knowledge base of how to re-
spond to certain types of percepts, in order to reach its destination
safely without contravening any rules of the road or causing harm
to its occupants or other persons.
4. A utility-based agent tries to maximise some measure of utility or
“happiness”: for instance if there are different ways of achieving
the same goal, a utility-based agent may aim to select the method
which involves the least effort or cost. For example, a self-driving
car might present its user with different options for a performance
measure: taking the fastest route, or one which is predicted to con-
sume the least fuel, the route with the most agreeable scenery, and
so on.
This “egocentric” concept of rationality is known as instrumental,
goal-oriented or strategic and is generally accepted within “classic”
AI, rational choice theory and certain schools of social science [24].
This approach is clearly tailored to the action-guiding dimension;
though within AI the action-guiding and explanatory/predictive di-
mensions may sometimes collapse if we assume that actions can be
simulated within an exact virtual model of the physical environment,
and the agent architecture includes notions of “desire” and “belief”.
2.3 Linguistic rationality
It has long been argued that only language-using agents can be capa-
ble of reasoning and abstract thought2. One proponent of this view is
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Donald Davidson [11], who maintains that a “rational animal” is one
that has propositional attitudes such as belief, desire and intention.
His argument is that in order to hold even one propositional attitude,
an agent must possess a substantial body of beliefs and conceptual
knowledge, and be capable of making logical inferences using these
concepts. Only a language-using agent can show evidence of this
kind of knowledge, and so only this class of agents can be acknowl-
edged as rational. This line of argument extends to actions:
Intentional action is action that can be explained in terms of
beliefs and desires whose propositional contents rationalize the
action. [11, p. 99]
It is not immediately clear whether a utility-based agent as desribed
in section 2.2 could be extended with these capabilities without rad-
ically redesigning the agent architecture. As Davidson points out,
agents such as unmanned autonomous drones behave in the way they
do not because they have personal desires or intentions to attack a
particular target, but because they are designed and operated by hu-
mans who have these desires3. He argues in his earlier [10] that this
“intentional” interpretation of rationality is more appropriate for ac-
tion explanations:
. . . I think that compared to attribution of of desires, preferences
or beliefs, the axioms of decision theory lend little empirical
force to explanations of action (p. 273)
So we may argue that linguistic rationality is a minimal requirement
for the project of explaining/predicting actions, if not sufficient in
itself. Davidson concludes that rationality is essentially a social trait:
“only communicators have it”.
It is worth noting at this point that John Searle [32] would not ac-
cept complex verbal behaviour as sufficient evidence of consicous-
ness or intentionality, since he argues that the architecture and phys-
ical make-up of digital computers render them incapable of such
states. Davidson [11] declines to address the question of “whether
all that prevents computers from being rational is their genesis”, and
we will likewise leave this question to one side for the present.
2.4 Discursive or argumentative rationality
Another approach may be termed discursive rationality, and charac-
terises agents that are capable of giving reasons for their actions and
asking for reasons from other agents. Two proponents of variants of
discursive rationality are Robert Brandom [3, 4, 5] and Ju¨rgen Haber-
mas [17, 18, 19, 20]. Both propose that agents who utter speech acts
are taking on certain kinds of commitments, including a commitment
to provide evidence for the truth or acceptability of one’s assertions.
Of course, in many circumstances it would not be reasonable to
call someone out on these commitments: as Brandom puts it, some-
times doubts too need to be justified. A reviewer gives the example
“it’s five o’clock and I’m in a hurry writing a paper” - one can un-
derstand they would be annoyed if asked to substantiate this claim.
Steinhoff [35] likewise argues that the statement “Yesterday I was at
home alone” would be“quite believable” in the absence of any proof.
This of course depends on the context: if someone answering my
description had been caught on CCTV stealing some rare jazz LPs
at the same time, a police officer investigating this larceny might be
less inclined to give me the benefit of the doubt. Steinhoff also ar-
gues that one can be subjectively certain of a claim without being
3 A distinction which is known in the literature as original versus derived
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in a position to justify it to others: “If aliens were to ‘beam’ me to
their planet in another galaxy without anyone else noticing, and then
‘beam’ me back shortly thereafter, then for me the thesis that aliens
exist would be a very well-justified thesis, without my being able to
justify it to others.” I would argue to the contrary that an episode
like this which would be quite outside my previous experience, and
which if true would violate my understanding of the laws of physics,
would be more reasonably interpreted both by myself and others as
a vivid dream or hallucination rather than a “first contact” with ex-
traterrestrial beings unless some robust independent evidence were
available.
It can be seen that the specifications for goal- and utility-based
agents do not include this ability to reflect on and reason about the
speech acts of oneself or others. Davidson does not explicitly address
this issue in the cited paper but it is arguable that an agent would
need the capacity to engage in argumentation in order to qualify for
“linguistic rationality”.
Brandom’s approach is concerned with “deontic” attitudes of hear-
ers, and of speakers as self-monitors, rather than intentional attitudes
of speakers as in classic Speech Act theory. In place of beliefs and
desires, Brandom discusses “doxastic” (propositional) and practical
commitments, which interacting agents may acknowledge or ascribe
to one another.
The normative dimensions of language use according to Brandom
comprise responsibility - if I make a claim, I am obliged to back
it up with appropriate evidence, argumentation and so on - and au-
thority - by making a claim to which I am assumed to be entitled, I
license others to make the same claim. The essential idea is that mak-
ing an assertion is taking on a commitment to defend that assertion
if challenged. There are obvious shared concerns with the notions of
commitment developed by [21, 38]. Brandom’s elaborations include
the notion of entitlement to commitments by virtue of evidence, ar-
gumentation etc; the interpersonal inheritance of commitments and
entitlements, and the treatment of consequential commitments and
incompatibility. Brandom has a similarly “holistic” conception of se-
mantics to Davidson, maintaining that in order to hold one belief it is
necessary to hold several, and to be capable of articulating inferential
relations among beliefs.
The mechanism for keeping track of agents’ commitments and en-
titlements consists of deontic scoreboards maintained by each inter-
locutor, which record the set of commitments and entitlements which
agents claim, acknowledge and attribute to one another (claims and
acknowledgements are forms of self-attribution). Scoreboards are
perspectival and may include both explicitly claimed commitments
and consequential commitments derived by inference. Thus an agent
may be assessed by others as being committed to propositions which
are entailed by his overt commitments, whether or not he acknowl-
edges such commitments. In principle, Brandom’s framework does
not necessitate imputing mental states to agents, as deontic statuses
are constituted by agents’ public or implicit attributions of commit-
ments and entitlements to one another, and he states at one point “I do
not officially believe in belief” [4]. In practice however, he regularly
slips into mentalistic talk, particularly when discussing intentions [3,
Ch. 3].
According to Habermas, interlocutors in a dialogue implicitly
make validity claims pertaining to each utterance:
• A claim that the propositional content of an assertion is true
(wahr) or that in the case of non-declarative utterances, the ex-
istential presuppositions of the propositional content are satisfied;
• A claim that the speaker is truthful (wahrhaftig) or reliable;
• A claim that the utterance is appropriate (richtig) according to any
applicable social norms.
What makes an agent rational is the ability and disposition to re-
spond appropriately to challenges to validity claims, by offering var-
ious forms of argumentation and evidence, with the aim of reaching
mutual understanding or rational consensus. Discursive rationality
presupposes the validity of a normative background of
institutions, roles, socioculturally habitualized forms of life –
that is, of conventions [18, p. 76]
Social norms of this kind are resistant to formalisation and, I would
argue, cannot be reduced to considerations of instrumental reasoning
[25]. If we accept the idea that speech acts raise these kinds of valid-
ity claims, it would seem reasonable to extend this to actions: agents
would be taken as implicitly claiming that their actions are appropri-
ate and effective. Brandom goes some way towards a unitary account
of propositional and practical commitments: to perform an action is,
at least implicitly, to claim an entitlement to being committed to that
action, and may also count as redeeming a commitment and/or tak-
ing on further commitments. To take a banal example, if you park
your car by the side of the road you are likely to be thereby com-
mitted to paying a fee to the local council; if you make appropriate
signalswhile driving you are committed to manoeuvring your vehi-
cle in various ways, and so on. In Habermas’s framework, we could
perhaps construe a rational, intentional action as raising claims to be
effective, deliberate and appropriate to prevailing social norms, cor-
responding to the discursive claims of truth, truthfulness and “right-
ness”.
2.5 Habermas’s Three Roots of Rationality
Habermas in his earlier work [17, 18] makes a distinction between
strategic and communicative uses of speech acts: the former is in-
tended by the speaker to achieve some end through its perlocutionary
effects, which need not be transparent to the hearer, while the latter
is intended to reach agreement or understanding with hearers and in-
volves a readiness to vindicate any validity claims as well as to take
seriously the claims of others. This classification can be argued to
have its roots in ethical considerations as well as communicative ef-
ficiency. Kant’s practical imperative enjoins us to treat ourselves and
other people as ends in themselves rather than means to an end [23],
while strategic action can involve treating others as means. And the
requirement to justify validity claims when challenged increases the
likelihood of arriving at a rational consensus [17].
One could take this further and argue that the possibility of achiev-
ing consensus assumes a reciprocal recognition of interlocutors as
persons with equal rights to offer and challenge validity claims. Lin-
guistic philosophers tend to abstract away from such considerations:
Searle stipulates as one of the preconditions for successful execution
of speech acts that “normal input-output conditions obtain”, mean-
ing that the interlocutors speak the same language and can hear each
other clearly; neither is physically impaired or under duress, acting
in a play, telling a joke and so on. Brandom’s framework of commit-
ments and entitlements appears to tacitly assume that participants in
discourse accord each other the same rights and opportunities to be
heard and to raise questions.
In later work [20], Habermas recognises three “roots of ra-
tionality” which in some ways reflect the distinctions above be-
tween instrumental, linguistic and discursive rationality, as well as
Bermu´dez’s projects of selecting, explaining/predicting and assess-
ing actions:
• Epistemic rationality concerns propositional or procedural
knowledge of facts about the world and ways of doing things,
which informs rational, goal-directed actions. This seems to ap-
proximately correspond to Davidsonian linguistic rationality, and
is arguably a requirement for the project of explaining/predicting
actions.
• Teleological rationality concerns the deliberate and purposeful
selection and implementations of means to achieve a desired re-
sult, on the basis of particular preferences. This is somewhat sim-
ilar to what we have labelled as instrumental rationality, except
that Habermas claims that this deliberation necessarily rests on
linguistically structured knowledge, intentions and inferences.
• Communicative rationality is essentially what we have called
“discursive rationality”: the ability and disposition to raise, chal-
lenge and defend validity claims of truth, truthfulness and appro-
priateness. This could be argued to be a prerequisite for the nor-
mative assessment of actions.
These three roots are conceptually distinct but are claimed to be
equally fundamental to the constitution of rational agents. At some
risk of forcing the similarities, one could conjecture that this three-
pronged approach equips us to tackle Bermu´dez’s three explanatory
projects - though of course this remains to be worked out in detail. By
contrast, the BDI framework aims to build linguistic agents “on top”
of utility-oriented, goal-seeking agents or planning systems. Within
the confines of this paper, we will look at one line of development in
languages for artificial agents and conclude that it does not succeed
in modelling successful communication.
2.6 The BDI framework
The BDI framework [28, 39] seems to combine elements of Haber-
mas’s epistemic and teleological rationality, in that agents are said to
be rational if they choose actions which are
in [their] own best interests, given the beliefs [they have] about
the world. [39, p. 1]
The framework claims to model agents with “mental states” such
as beliefs, desires and intentions, but it is not clear that these enti-
ties possess or manipulate propositional or conceptual knowledge as
stipulated by Davidson and Brandom as a prerequisite for rational-
ity. Rather, “beliefs” in these systems are data structures represent-
ing some aspects of the state of the world, while “desires” and “in-
tentions” represent preferences and a currently chosen course of ac-
tion. Agents can be considered “rational” according to the BDI model
without necessarily having linguistic capabilities: these are typically
implemented by treating language itself as a kind of action, follow-
ing variants of Austin and Searle’s Speech Act theories as discussed
below. It is generally assumed in these models that intentions are con-
strained by beliefs and desires: that is, an agent’s intended or planned
actions will be governed by what it believes the current state of the
world to be, how it desires the state of the world to change and what
actions it believes can be successfully executed. It might be more
psychologically plausible to consider in addition whether beliefs can
be moulded by desires and intentions, particularly when agents have
powerful desires and their beliefs are based on partial or inconsis-
tent evidence: for example a political leader wishing to overthrow a
tyrant might be more disposed to give credence to claims that the
tyrant possesses fearsome weapons which can be readily mobilised
[33].
3 Communicating Agents
This section looks at some applications of Speech Act Theory to the
specification of communication languages and protocols for intelli-
gent software agents (ACLs) originating with Cohen and Perrault’s
seminal 1979 paper [8]. Some desiderata for agent communications
were listed by Cohen and Levesque [7]:
A language for interagent communication should allow agents
to enlist the support of others to achieve goals, to commit to
the performance of actions for other agents, to monitor their
execution, to report progress, success and failure, to refuse task
allocations, to acknowledge receipt of messages, etc.
Cohen and Perrault proposed that the essential characteristics of
speech acts as described by Searle [30] can be captured using clas-
sic AI planning operators and knowledge representation, techniques
which fall under the headings of goal- and utility-oriented agents
as outlined above. The question thus arises whether linguistic and
discursively rational agents can be developed within an architecture
for instrumental agency. We discuss below whether work in compu-
tational linguistics and agent design following on from Cohen and
Perrault has succeeded in in modelling successful communication
among autonomous agents, and we conclude that no convincing so-
lution has been found. Firstly, in the next section we briefly outline
some essentials of Speech Act theory.
3.1 Speech Acts and Communicative Action
The idea that utterances or “locutions” can have the effect of actions
which change the state of the world goes back at least to Hegel’s
Lectures on the Philosophy of History [22]:
Reden aber sind Handlungen unter Menschen und zwar sehr
wesentlich wirksame Handlungen.
Speeches, it must be allowed, are veritable transactions in the
human commonwealth; in fact, very gravely influential trans-
actions.
Hegel here considers the impact of speech on the world-historical
level; the 20th-century Anglo-American programme of Speech Act
Theory, which developed out of Oxonian “ordinary language” phi-
losophy, showed that it could be fruitful to view utterances as actions
on a more parochial level. A special case of speech acts or illocu-
tionary acts is the performative, where pronouncing a sentence has
the effect of performing the action it appears to describe or refer to:
1. I pronounce you man and wife.
2. I promise I will come to the seminar.
Whether such acts are performed successfully or appropriately de-
pends on factors such as the speaker’s social role, their sincerity and
so on: for instance only an ordained minister or authorised govern-
ment employee can correctly utter (1). Other types of speech acts
lack the performative feature but may still be seen as actions which
change the world in some way: for example, questions or requests
can have the effect of imposing some obligation on the hearer, when
uttered in appropriate circumstances:
3. What is the capital of Peru?
4. Please come to the seminar.
3.2 “Classic” Anglo-American Speech Act Theory
The essence of Speech Act Theory is the assumption that agents as
speakers (S) typically produce utterances with the intention of bring-
ing about some change in the beliefs of a hearer (H), and that Hs
recognition of this intention is crucial to the success of the speech
act. Speech acts are sub-categorised by their preparatory conditions
and essential conditions; for instance the preparatory conditions for
assertion of a proposition p are that S has evidence for the truth of
p and it is not obvious that H knows p, while the essential condition
is that uttering an assertion counts as an undertaking to the effect
that p represents an actual state of affairs [30]. For Habermas [18]
the illocutionary force serves to establish a social relation between
interlocutors: for instance a request to borrow money seeks to set up
a relation between creditor and debtor.
Speech act theory since [1] has distinguished between illocution-
ary effects including changes in the hearers beliefs which are con-
ventional consequences of an utterance, and perlocutionary effects
including consequences of an act which may or may not have been
intended by the speaker. According to Searle [30], utterances can be
broken down into their propositional content and their illocutionary
force, which classifies acts as assertions, requests, questions, com-
mands and so on.
3.3 Agents and Agent Communication
We shall see in the following survey that there is a tension between
agent autonomy and the requirements of successful communica-
tion. Wooldridge [39] points out a paradox in mentalistic speech act
based semantics for the inform locution in communication between
autonomous software agents:
If I am completely autonomous, and exercise complete control
over my mental state, then nothing you say will have any effect
on my mental state (. . . ) if you are attempting to inform me of
some state of affairs, then the best you can do is convince me
that you believe this state of affairs.
As observed by [26], it is not clear that this roundabout approach
succeeds in resolving the “paradox of communication”. If the hearer
agent is “completely autonomous”, then convincing it that you be-
lieve P or even that you intend it to believe P seem just as problem-
atic as getting it to believe P itself: both of these are still an attempt
by the speaker to bring about a change in the hearer’s mental state.
4 Initial formalisations of Speech Act Theory
Searle’s [30] formulation of necessary and sufficient conditions for
illocutionary acts is certainly an advance over Austin’s [1] origi-
nal proposals in its relatively explicit and systematic nature. Indeed,
Searle with Daniel Vanderveken [31] developed a formalization of
the theory known as Illocutionary Logic. However, subsequent im-
plementations of Speech Act Theory in computational dialogue mod-
elling and intelligent agent communication did not develop directly
from this work, but rather from work rooted in the AI tradition of
planning, reasoning and knowledge representation. Cohen and Per-
rault [8] showed in a now classic paper that there is a compelling
similarity between Searle’s necessary and sufficient conditions for
performance of speech acts and the pre-and post-conditions used to
define planning operators in AI. Cohen and Perrault were explic-
itly concerned to develop the beginnings of a “competence theory
of speech act communication” by presenting planning operators and
inferential rules for plan construction that “should lead to the gener-
ation of plans for those speech acts that a person could issue appro-
priately under the same circumstances”.
In order to be able to model the successful performance and up-
take of selected speech acts, they adopt a simplifying assumption of
complete cooperativity among interlocutors, such that for example to
request someone to do something is sufficient to get them to want to
do it.
In Cohen and Perrault’s system the preconditions for planning op-
erators capture Searle’s preparatory and sincerity conditions, while
the effect models the essential condition. The authors state that
speakers “cannot influence their hearers beliefs and goals directly”,
and the INFORM act is accordingly defined so that it can be per-
formed successfully without the hearer necessarily actually coming
to believe the asserted proposition. The CONVINCE act is defined to
demonstrate that perlocutionary effects can be achieved if we assume
that agents have complete trust in informants’ truthfulness and relia-
bility. There is a snag here, however. The definition of INFORM still
specifies that the hearer’s mental state is updated as a result of the
action, with the belief that the speaker believes what they say. This
runs contrary to the principle that other agents’ world models cannot
be directly modified by communicative actions.
While a speaker often has performed illocutionary acts with
the goal of achieving certain perlocutionary effects, the actual
securing of those effects is beyond his control (Op cit: 187)
It turns out that in a multi agent environment, the securing of illocu-
tionary effects on the recipient may also be beyond the control of a
communicating agent. Thus we may question whether the distinction
between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is a useful one in this
context.
Cohen and Levesque [6] have the ostensible aim of presenting a
logical theory which “predicts dialogue phenomena” and can be ap-
plied to the development of “algorithms for human-computer inter-
action in natural language”. In fact the theory is presented at some
level of abstraction from any natural language constructions: the pa-
per contains very few natural language examples, mostly simple im-
peratives such as “Open the door”.
Note that C&L treat all communicative acts as “attempts”, i.e.
nothing in the definition of an act entails any changes in the ad-
dressee’s goals or intentions, which would be incompatible with the
addressee’s status as an autonomous agent. Success of an illocution-
ary act requires not only that the utterer has performed the act cor-
rectly, but in addition that interlocutors can be assumed to be sincere
and helpful; formal definitions of both of these characteristics are
provided.
In summary, Cohen and Levesque’s system does not seem to be
vulnerable to the objections we have noted as applying to Cohen and
Perrault [8] since they do not define actions which directly modify
the state of another agent; rather, the success or failure of an ac-
tion depends on the addressee’s level of helpfulness and the extent to
which the addressee regards the hearer as sincere. Interestingly, the
authors define two degrees of success criteria which seem to match
the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects: a re-
quester is committed to his request being understood, in that he will
be likely to repeat it if it seems that the addressee has not heard him
clearly; but it is not required that the agent is committed to the per-
locutionary goal of getting the addressee to perform the required ac-
tion. Essentially, it appears that an illocutionary act may be accepted
or rejected by a recipient, while the sender has the option of repeat-
ing the same action or giving up. There appears to be no mechanism
for receivers to challenge or query on action on specific grounds, or
for the sender to present an argument or further evidence to persuade
the receiver to accept a request.
5 Communication languages for software agents
The most ambitious programme for developing an artifical com-
munication regime along the lines of SAT was the FIPA ACL
[16, 15, 14, 13]. Communicative acts are specified in terms of
their feasibility preconditions (FP) which correspond to Searle’s
preparatory and sincerity conditions, and rational effect (RE) spec-
ifying the intended outcome of a CA. The latter corresponds to the
perlocutionary effect: for example the RE of an assertive act is that
the hearer comes to believe the asserted proposition, not simply to be
aware that the speaker believes it. Since perlocutionary effects are not
under the direct control of the sender, REs are generally not regarded
as deterministic but are qualified with statements like the following
[14]:
Whether or not the receiver does, indeed, adopt belief in the
proposition will be a function of the receivers trust in the sin-
cerity and reliability of the sender.
This in fact seems rather too loosely worded, as surely the receiver
would also take into account any independent evidence it has as to the
truth of the proposition: the sender may be utterly sincere and nor-
mally reliable, but simply mistaken in a given instance. And given
that the sender may not be aware how much it is trusted by the re-
ceiver, it is not clear how it should decide whether to update its model
of the receivers beliefs – in any case this is not covered in the specifi-
cations. Illocutionary effects are not specified for individual commu-
nicative acts but are partially implemented via an over-arching axiom
called Property 4: “When an agent observes a CA, it should believe
that the agent performing the act has the intention (to make public
its intention) to achieve the rational effect of the act. This is called
the ’intentional effect’” [14]. To spell things out: an agent i should
believe that if agent j has performed an action a of a particular type,j
intends that the defined rational effect of this type of action should
come about.
The FIPA specifications envisage that agents will have the capacity
to reason about other agents’ knowledge and beliefs; for example, an
agent i seeking to inform agent j of proposition p should choose one
of three different communicative acts, depending on its model of j’s
prior beliefs or lack of belief concerning p.
How can agents reason about each others’ beliefs? Some sources
of evidence are utterances that agents have produced, and utterances
they have received. In the first case, an agent’s beliefs should match
the preconditions for any communicative acts that it executes, and
these beliefs are assumed to persist after the act has been performed
according to an axiom designated “Property 5” [14]. In the latter
case, the agent’s beliefs may match the REs of communications they
have received, though this would count as weaker evidence.
Preconditions which require the sender to have knowledge of the
receivers state of mind are not realistic as the sender cannot verify
whether they actually hold; nor, a fortiori, can the sender directly
determine whether the RE has been achieved. It turns out however
that the full specifications do not assume that agents’ behaviour is
based solely on semantic reasoning; rather a number of predefined
protocols are available which mandate response to particular mes-
sage types [13]:
The protocol parameter defines the interaction protocol in
which the ACL message is generated. This parameter is op-
tional; however, developers are advised that employing ACL
without the framework of an interaction protocol (and thus di-
rectly using the ACL semantics to control the agents generation
and interpretation of ACL messages) is an extremely ambitious
undertaking.
The FIPA ACL specification includes interaction protocols for cer-
tain common sequences of message exchanges, enabling agents to
cut down on the extent of reasoning required at any step: rather than
forward-chaining from the current state of a model to find appropri-
ate actions to achieve their goals, they can apply backward-chaining
from a restricted set of available options specified by the protocol in
order to find which, if any, has FPs that match the current state.
A running theme of this paper has been the tension between agent
autonomy and the requirements of successful communication, which
manifests itself in several ways: genuinely autonomous agents can
never be certain that an interlocutor’s mental state matches the pre-
conditions for an utterance, nor that the required effects have been
achieved. As Poslad [27] observes, the specifications for commu-
nicative acts in FIPA ACL require the sender to respect the FPs in
order to send a message, but do not oblige the receiver to respect the
RE:
The actual interpretation of the sender’s intentional effect in
the receiving agent is considered to be relative to each agent
and to be customizable by each agent. Algorithms for BDI rule
engines to interpret the sender’s intent at the receiver are not
specified by FIPA, although, this has been proposed and dis-
cussed several times at FIPA meetings. The semantics is un-
derspecified in the sense that whilst receiving agents receive
CAs concerning the intentions and beliefs of the sender, receiv-
ing agents are free to carry out their internal actions, such as
changing beliefs, which may be consistent or inconsistent with
the sender’s CA.
We have seen variants of assertive actions which seem to fall be-
tween two stools: on the one hand they aim only at causing the re-
ceiver to believe that the sender believes the asserted proposition,
rather than getting the receiver to believe the proposition itself; on
the other, even this modest goal is actually too strong if we take agent
autonomy seriously. In fact it is doubtful whether BDI agents are ac-
tually implementable in their “pure” form [27]:
BDI models have incomplete axiomizations and can be com-
putationally complex or even intractable. The BDI model fo-
cuses on private belief and intention transfer between individ-
uals. It doesnt take into account third party or societal inter-
action and associated constraints. BDI models seldom focus
on pragmatic issues such as belief and intention management.
These can make the model computationally complex or even
intractable.
Finally we should briefly mention Singh’s [34] social semantics
for agent communication languages, which is explicitly designed to
avoid having to attribute mental states to artificial software agents
and is not explicitly intended to model human communication. Singh
claims to follow Habermas in distinguishing three levels of validity
claim that are raised with each communication: objective (the claim
is true), subjective (the sender is sincere, and believes the content
of the communication) and practical (the sender is justified in send-
ing the communication, e.g. in taking on a particular commitment,
or making a request or prohibition). The cited paper includes for-
malisations of communicative acts such as inform, request, permit,
forbid, promise and declare. However, although these formalisations
include specifications of the agents’ commitments or validity claims,
there seems to be no locution or protocol for challenging or justi-
fying these claims, so the model cannot claim to faithfully reflect
Habermas’s original notion of communicative rationality.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper has looked at various ideas of what makes up a rational
agent, and we have discussed some evidence that rationality requires
three separate, if linked, capabilities:
1. Ability to select actions in order to achieve some aim, whether by
maximising utility or formal practical reasoning;
2. Ability to explain and predict one’s own actions or those of other
agents;
3. Ability to assess actions against some normative standards.
We have conjectured that this distinction roughly corresponds to the
classification of rationality models as instrumental, linguistic and dis-
cursive, and to Habermas’s “three roots of rationality”. Habermas is
the only one of the researchers we have considered who attempts to
pull together different dimensions of rationality within a unitary ac-
count, though further work will be needed to establish whether his
approach can adequately tackle these three explanatory projects. Fi-
nally, we have looked at one particular strand of work in AI which
aims to construct rational agents, and argued that the resulting arte-
facts fall short of being fully rational according to the above criteria.
David Traum’s observation still holds true [36]:
While a comprehensive theory of speech acts will strain most
contemporary theories of rational agency, requiring a very ex-
pressive theory of action and mental state, it also provides a
good testbed for a theory of agency in a multi-agent world.
In fact it is doubtful whether any ACL specification can so far be
said to incorporate a “comprehensive theory of speech acts”, as many
questions have been left unresolved. It has proved chellenging to
specify exactly how the intended outcomes of communicative acts
should be specified in ways that take full account of the receivers
autonomy. The systems we have considered tend to assume an ego-
centric model of goal-directed agency, in contrast to Habermas and
Brandom’s conceptions of rational agency which postulate a norma-
tive background for communicative action. Each of the implementa-
tions and formalisations we have considered turns out to rely on some
external mechanism to secure uptake, such as norms of sincerity and
cooperativity or mandated communications protocols.
To return to where we started: there is an interesting connection
between the notion of discursive rationality and Turing’s [37] pro-
posal that the ability to conduct unrestricted conversation in natural
language could be taken as indicative of intelligence. This ability
would have to encompass giving reasons or justifications for claims
as well as demanding them. This is precisely what is missing from
the various “chatbots” which have been entered for the annual Loeb-
ner Prize: see for example this exchange involving “Mitsuku”, the
most successful entrant in the 2016 competition4.
Judge: The cat tried to climb in the box but got stuck because it
was too big. What was too big?
Mitsuku: Well at least they tried their best. Large, above aver-
age in size or number or quantity or magnitude or extent.
4 See http://www.aisb.org.uk/events/loebner-prize#Results16
The reader will recall that Turing offered few substantive arguments
in favour of his proposal, focussing instead on rebutting a series of
anticipated objections. If the claims of this paper are accepted, dis-
cursive abilities can be taken as a necessary if not sufficient condition
for agents to be considered to be rational, adding a positive argument
for Turing’s proposal alongside his negative ones.
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